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This paper uses the sustainable livelihoods framework to explore the contribution 
of smallholder production to food security in some sub-Saharan African countries 
and relates it to the South African case. Noting that many of the world’s hungry 
are smallholder farmers, it is clear that food insecurity is closely linked to the 
livelihood strategies of these farm households. As previous studies have shown, 
food insecurity is linked to livelihood assets, strong institutional support and a 
favourable external environment. In particular, the paper finds that food security 
depends on cereal output, budgetary support to agriculture, agricultural value 
added and poverty – all variables strongly linked to the sustainable livelihoods 
framework. Since most poor rural households rely on agricultural production for a 
significant share of their household income, increasing agricultural productivity is 
critical to increase food security and reduce rural poverty.  
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1.   Introduction 
 
In recent years, several countries in sub-Saharan Africa have emphasised 
the importance of employment in rural areas as a way of reducing rural 
poverty and food insecurity. This has taken the form of establishing 
schemes to identify strategic priorities and channel financial resources to 
rural development. In essence the primary motive is to solve the 
immediate problem of hunger through smallholder production of food 
and the generation of sufficient income to enable rural populations to buy 
enough food (Dorward et al., 2004). This contrasts with past policies where 
agriculture was seen to be the only employment sector in rural areas. 
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Today’s rural areas have changed and offer different business 
opportunities, not only in agriculture, but also in service sectors such as 
retail, mass and small-scale tourism, and in aquaculture. However, many 
countries still regard agricultural self-employment in rural areas as the key 
element of rural development. Since most of the production in rural areas 
is conducted by farming households, the belief is that production plays an 
important role in rural livelihood strategies. How significant that role is or 
could be is not altogether clear, but this paper aims to explore the evidence 
about the conditions under which own production has contributed to food 
security in some Sub-Saharan African countries and draw inferences about 
how South Africa can boost smallholder own production in order to 
reduce food insecurity.  
 
Further, agricultural growth that fosters improvements in productivity on 
small farms has proven to be highly effective in reducing poverty and 
hunger and raising rural living standards, as demonstrated in large parts 
of Asia during the Green Revolution (Rosegrant & Hazell, 2000). Evidence 
from across Southern Africa indicates that several efforts have been made 
towards resourcing rural areas, where most smallholder farmers were the 
main beneficiaries. The aim was to increase production and employment 
by providing subsidised inputs and developing production-related 
infrastructure and institutional service provision (Stanning, 1989; Poulton 
et al., 2006a; Rukuni et al., 2006; World Bank, 2008). Unfortunately, this has 
resulted in little real progress in agricultural employment and food 
security. Using the sustainable livelihoods framework the author seeks to 
find out why this has been the case and use the variables suggested to 
found out whether there is a relationship between them and the 
proportion of people undernourished in 38 countries from Sub-Saharan 
Africa.2  
 
Although actual policies employed differ slightly across the sub-region, 
most of the interventions were tailored primarily towards providing policy 
support with increased extension services, subsidised inputs, increased 
access to markets and farmer training, including demonstrations, for 
increased output. In Senegal, Zambia, Kenya and Uganda in the decade 
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1980–1990, government policy efforts were focused primarily on 
production infrastructure, although intervention was curtailed by public 
finance cutbacks in the name of macro-economic stabilisation (Fan et al., 
2003; Poulton et al., 2006b). Productivity (in terms of relative output 
growth) fell by between 4% and 13%. However, some countries in the 
region have had better success by directing support almost exclusively to 
smallholder farmers (e.g. Zimbabwe in the 1980s and Malawi in the early 
2000s). 
 
In order to examine the contribution of own production to food security, 
this article begins by considering who the hungry are, before considering 
the conceptual framework of the study and context of smallholder 
livelihood performance (Section 3). Section 3 goes on to explore major 
elements of the framework - natural capital, human capital, and 
institutional support to smallholders – as they apply to boosting food 
production. In Section 4 a simple regression equation is applied to find out 
if there is a relationship between some of the identified variables (or their 
proxies) and food insecurity. The article concludes by drawing out the 
implications of the findings for South Africa.  
 
2.    Smallholder agricultural producers and hunger  
 
Most of the world’s hungry live in rural areas, and depend on the 
consumption and sale of natural products for both their income and food. 
50% of the world’s hungry are smallholder farmers, 20% are landless rural, 
20% are pastoralists, fishers and forest dependent and 20% are the urban 
poor (FAO, 2008). The largest proportion of the hungry is concentrated 
among the world’s landless, or smallholder farmers whose plots are too 
small to provide for their needs. However, hunger is also a growing 
problem in the fast-growing poor urban spaces as well, which are now 
home to more than 40% of urban inhabitants in developing countries.3  
 
In sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia, the proportion of 
undernourished people has decreased in the last two decades, but the 
numbers of hungry people have been rising (FAO, 2004). In absolute 
terms, the number of undernourished people in the developing world fell 
by just nine million over this period. This suggests that smallholder 
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farmers are central to efforts to tackle food insecurity in the developing 
world. In sub Saharan Africa, landless rural dwellers are also a critical 
target group. In general, these two groups are characterised by a low level 
of livelihood assets (Ellis & Freeman, 2004).  
 
3.      The sustainable livelihoods framework, poverty and food 
insecurity  
 
Juxtaposing the farming systems and livelihood strategies of poor farmers 
against those of their wealthier counterparts often raises more questions 
about rationality of these producers. The initial step to developing a better 
understanding of the structural predicaments sustaining poverty and food 
insecurity in African villages begins by understanding the premise of their 
livelihood strategies. When the root causes and behavioural manifestations 
of poverty and household food insecurity are not understood, then policy 
interventions are likely to be ill-informed and unlikely to succeed in 
moving the poor out of poverty and food insecurity (Mano, 2006). To 
influence changes in the poverty outcome for smallholder farmers one 
needs to take into account a framework that considers the relationship 
between internal and external influences on the households to their 
livelihood outcomes. The sustainable livelihoods framework (Figure 2) is 






























Figure 1:   Sustainable livelihoods framework 
Source: DFID & FAO (2000) 
 
The sustainable livelihoods approach recognises that households need to 
possess assets essential to their livelihood strategies: human capital, 
natural capital, financial capital, social capital and physical capital. 
Households adjust to their physical, social, economic and political 
environments by using these assets, through a set of livelihood strategies 
designed to strengthen their wellbeing (Timmer, 2003; Bryceson, 2005). 
Households are only viewed as being sustainable if they can adjust to 
threats without compromising their future ability to survive shocks to their 
livelihoods. This framework suggests that adequate ownership of 
livelihood capital assets is essential for pursuing a range of livelihood 
opportunities, and is a key determinant of livelihood performance and 
ability to accumulate assets for optimal production and for consumption 
smoothing in the face of seasonal climatic and market risks. Reducing asset 
poverty is the key to enhancing food security and livelihoods for poor and 
vulnerable rural agricultural populations. All transformation of structures 
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livelihood strategies in order to attain higher livelihood outcomes (DFID & 
FAO, 2000; Dorward & Kydd, 2004).  
 
This article considers evidence from studies in sub-Saharan Africa through 
the prism of the sustainable livelihoods framework – i.e. physical capital, 
human capital, and financial capital as they relate to policies, institutions 
and processes. This is used to identify the determinants of food insecurity 
in sub-Saharan Africa in order to draw inferences and implications for the 
South Africa case.  
 
3.1 Natural  capital   
 
Access to, and use of, natural and physical capital varies considerably both 
within and among countries (FAO, 2004). Small landholders consistently 
employ practices that are less capital-intensive than other producers are in 
favour of using their most abundant resource - their own labour. Human 
capital is strongly related to the level of wealth – heads of poorer 
households are generally less educated than those of richer households. A 
third element, the environment (or climate) is increasingly being put 
forward as one of the most important drivers of food insecurity in the sub-
Saharan region. For sub-Saharan Africa, overall output per worker in 
agriculture was $486 in 2005 and $243 in 2003, barely over a $1/day (FAO, 
2007). By contrast, the output per worker in non-agriculture was $3 770. 
This strongly suggests that poverty and food insecurity in the region is, at 
least in a proximate sense, related to low productivity in agriculture. 
Despite this, it seems that household production continues to be an 
important livelihood strategy in the region.  
 
According to households, determinants of food security go beyond climate 
and the environment, or land and tenure security. In a review of several 
studies of household food security in southern Africa, Misselhorn (2005) 
isolated 33 drivers identified by householders as being critical 
determinants of food security. The mix of drivers varied across the region, 
but households in all communities indicated that many interacting factors 
resulted in vulnerability to food insecurity. Using the lens of the 33 drivers, 
Misselhorn inspected 555 literature citations and determined the top seven 




commonly cited driver of food insecurity, and poverty,4 property rights, 
human capital, market access and unemployment being the next most 
significant factors.  
  
Clearly, agricultural capital and levels of poverty are determinants of food 
security. What this means is that, in sub-Saharan Africa, a person who is 
poor is probably also food-insecure. It does not establish whether being 
poor causes food insecurity, or vice versa.  
 
Table  1:    Key drivers of food insecurity identified by rural 
smallholders 












Failures in property 
rights 
5 Poverty  7 
Climate/environment 12  Market  access  4 
    Food price increases  5 
   Lack  of  education  5 
   Unemployment    5 
Source: Scholes and Biggs (2004) 
 
The fact that unemployment is amongst the most mentioned drivers of 
food insecurity suggests that there is a significant non-farm set of 
livelihood strategies in Southern Africa. What is not clear is whether the 
term ‘unemployment’ in these studies refers to unemployment in its 
w i d e s t  s e n s e ,  o r  t o  a g r i c u l t u r a l  unemployment. For this reason, the 
regression analysis below does not include unemployment as an 
independent variable.  
 
In another study, Ziervogel et al. (2005) compared the determinants of food 
insecurity from four case studies: Mangondi village in Limpopo, South 
Africa; Gireigikh rural council in North Kordofan, Sudan; Chingowa 
village in Borno State, Nigeria; and Tlaxcala State, Mexico. They found 
that, since each of the study sites is in a dry, drought-prone climate, 
declining precipitation is a source of major concern for household food 
security. However, they also found that household characteristics related 
to resource access play a dominant role in determining household food 
security. These include household income, income diversification, area of 
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land cultivated, soil quality, household labour per hectare cultivated, and 
health status of household members. In addition there are also factors 
external to the household that play a role. These include existence of 
formal and informal social networks, availability and quality of health 
services, and prices of farm inputs and outputs.  
 
The foregoing implies that the set of problems that are faced by the rural 
poor in increasing production are diverse, with a potentially diverse set of 
solutions. From a sustainable livelihoods perspective this indicates that 
capital assets mostly of a natural type (for example, land) or a physical 
type (for example, infrastructure), are at the root of attempts to enable 
farmers to successfully produce for themselves. However, these have to be 
complemented by policies, processes and institutions to enable the 
attainment of particular livelihood outcomes (Mano, 2006).  
 
Table 2 is a comparison of the proportion of undernourished people and 
per capita agricultural gross domestic product (GDP) of selected countries 
in 1991 and 2003. The table shows that the variables (particularly per 
capita agricultural GDP) that are correlated with a decrease in the 
proportion of the undernourished varied across a selection of 10 countries. 
In most countries that had a combination of good economic growth 
performance and a significant rise in per capita agricultural GDP, a 
positive effect on the prevalence of the undernourished was observed. 
However, this does not imply a strictly causal relationship between these 
factors. Researchers are yet to establish definitive causality in the links 
between agricultural growth and general economic growth using country 
data (Gardner & Tsakok, 2007).  




Table 2:  Prevalence of undernourished people as a percentage of the 
total population and per capita gross domestic product in 
selected sub-Saharan countries 
Country  Per capita agricultural 
GDP of the agricultural 
population 
(US$ constant 2000 prices) 
Per capita GDP  
(US$ constant 2000 prices) 
Proportion of 
undernourished in 
total population (%) 
 1989-1991  2003  1989  -1991  2003  1989-1991  2003 
Cote d’Ivoire  239  330  668  615  18 14 
Ghana 148  175  215  273  37 12 
Kenya 87  78  372  341  39 31 
Malawi 41  70  134  147  50 34 
Mozambique 63  80  161  254  66  45 
Senegal 119  119  421  492  23 23 
Uganda 91  112  177  271  26 19 
Zambia 81  88  370  341  48 47 
Zimbabwe 117  178 587  604 45  45 
Source: FAO, 2007 
 
It is important that in some countries though a fall in the prevalence of 
under-nourishment did not translate into a reduction in the number of the 
malnourished (not included in Table 2), but even there, there was an 
increase in the average dietary energy supply, expressed as kilocalories per 
capita per day, and indeed there were increases in Uganda, for example, 
from 4.2 million to 4.6 million people.  
 
Table 3:  Number of undernourished people and cereal production in 
selected countries 
Country  Cereals (thousand tonnes)  Number of people undernourished 
(millions) 
 1989-1991  2003  1989-1991  2003 
Cote d’Ivoire  1225  1808  2.3  2.2 
Ghana 1155  2041  5.8  2.4 
Kenya 2958  3351  9.5  9.7 
Malawi 1560  2142  4.8  4.0 
Mozambique 629  1813 9.2  8.3 
Senegal 996  1452  1.8  2.2 
Uganda 1597  2413  4.2  4.6 
Zambia 1467  1365  4.0  5.1 
Zimbabwe 2393  1259  4.8  5.7 
Source: FAO, 2007 
 
Most countries in this bracket achieved this through increases in food 
imports and or food aid. Increases in food imports and or food aid resulted 




domestic linkage effects of agriculture are minimal. Since the food deficit 
was covered from external (to the domestic economy), increases in food 
supply does not lead to increases in rural incomes that could be generated 
from domestic production linkages. This suggests that, in cases like these, 
economic growth might not include output expansion by smallholder 
farmers.  
 
In other studies, productivity increases have been shown to have a strong 
positive impact on the rural economy, leading to increased food 
availability at the household level (FAO, 2004). In addition, the increased 
incomes of smallholders provide stimulus to rural economic activity by 
generating increased demand. In Malawi rural economic activity increased 
substantially following an increase in food production and the livelihoods 
of households in the areas affected improved, opening avenues for 
smallholders to strengthen their livelihood assets (Dorward & Kydd, 2004). 
Haggblade et al. (1989) and Delgado et al. (1998) illustrate how the linkages 
between agriculture and the local economy can take many forms 
depending on the particular circumstances of the farmers and the 
livelihood assets they hold and or have access to. Usually consumption 
linkages are particularly significant but other indirect linkages between 
sectors mediated via investments, infrastructure and skills are also 
important. Using data from several sources Delgado et al. (1998) estimated 
agricultural sector multipliers for Senegal (1989-1990) and for Zambia 
(1985-1986) of 1.31 to 4.625, although they found the average for the 
continent to be closer to 1.4. The important point is that rural poverty 
reduction depends on rising yields in agriculture, creating growth linkages 
in rural non-farm sectors.  
 
However for some parts of Africa including South Africa, some authors 
(Bryceson, 2003; Dorward & Kydd, 2004; Ellis & Freeman, 2004) have 
suggested that this market link might be weak resulting in smallholder 
agricultural producers engaging in more than one livelihood production 
activity. In this sense using more than one livelihood strategy can be 
represented as a result of failure of agriculture to provide a sufficient 
livelihood for a substantial proportion of rural dwellers (Bryceson & Bank, 
2001; Bryceson, 2002). This view holds that a process of ‘deagrarianisation’ 
is occurring whereby farming is becoming a part-time, residual activity 
and livelihoods are becoming increasingly oriented towards non-farm and 




(Ellis & Mdoe, 2003; Ellis et al., 2003; Ellis & Freeman, 2004) and in 
Zimbabwe (Zikhali, 2009) shows that amongst other things the poorest and 
most vulnerable are the ones most heavily reliant on agriculture, but they 
hold less than 0.5 hectares of land, are most strongly locked into 
subsistence within agriculture and struggle to generate substantial cash 
from non-farm sources. These would typically represent households with 
very low livelihood assets including low human and social capital. 
 
However, engagement in market exchange and livelihood diversification 
could show a ‘virtuous’ and cumulative spiral upwards.5 In this way, 
smallholders with low levels of livelihood assets could steadily be 
propelled towards more mainstream market exchange as assets can serve 
as collateral, households with sufficient assets can exploit investment, and 
agricultural expansion opportunities can more effectively generate cash 
income. It is thus important for policy makers to be clear what type of 
livelihood diversification is being observed and hence to design policies 
that address cash constraints for further development where appropriate. 
This paper limits its attention to a single variable – capital stock. Although 
capital stock is difficult to measure, it is an important component of 
identifying interventions aimed at supporting livelihoods diversification. 
The definition should be as wide was possible, acknowledging that some 
items may be seen as capital stock from one point of view, but not from 
another. For example, livestock is capital of a kind, but it may also have a 
less tangible significance that goes beyond seeing livestock as mere capital.  
 
3.2  Land, food security and employment 
 
The Integrated Food Security Strategy of the South African government 
and the land reform policy of the Zimbabwean and Namibian 
governments highlight land, among other things, as an important factor in 
food security (Moyo, 2006). This is because there cannot be enough 
smallholder production and household food security if households do not 
have access to land of enough quantity and quality to make a difference in 
either the quantity produced or the amount of income generated from the 
output. Such people can – in principle – significantly reduce their 
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vulnerability to food insecurity if they were to have access to land for 
smallholder production and sales. Many rural smallholders in this region 
therefore depend very much on wage or non-farm employment. In other 
words, employment is important in most rural areas, but as farm jobs have 
continued to dwindle – driven partly by land reform - and poverty spreads 
and deepens, vulnerability to food insecurity also increases.  
 
As part of a study to monitor the quality of life of land reform beneficiaries 
in South Africa, May and Rohr (2000) concluded that land reform could 
potentially reduce the poverty rates in rural areas by 1%. This figure, 
though it seems to be very small, does indicate that land reform can reduce 
poverty and lower vulnerability to food insecurity in South Africa. The 
larger the size of the available land and the smaller the number of 
beneficiaries, the higher the farm income per household and the lower the 
vulnerability to food insecurity provided the beneficiaries are not 
encumbered by debt. Mlambo (2000) also finds that rural households with 
a sizeable amount of land are better off (in terms of personal welfare) and 
are less likely to be poor and food-insecure than those with marginal lands 
or without land. 
 
Most of the above studies only considered agricultural production when 
estimating household incomes derived from land. Land can be and has 
been used in various parts of the world, and in South Africa, to create 
other rural livelihoods. These livelihoods include the collection of natural 
resources such as fuel wood, edible herbs and fruits, aquaculture, game-
meat, medicines and other items, either for direct consumption or for sale 
(Shackleton & Shackleton, 1999). This is critical for food security in rural 
areas and in some urban areas as well (Jacobs & Xaba, 2008). International 
experience also shows the importance of access to land and land reform in 
alleviating poverty and hence food insecurity. 
 
Evidence from further afield also indicates the importance of access to 
land. The result of reforming landholding and access in China was a 
reduction in income-based absolute poverty to an average of 
approximately 6 to 11% from 1979 to 1981 (El-Ghonemy, 1990). There was 
also a sustained reduction in the number of the poor, from about 240 
million to about 50 to 80 million, over the same period. Furthermore, the 
agricultural growth rate, crop yields and per capita food grain production 




improvement in livelihoods after land reform. The South Korean land 
reform programme resulted in 60% increase of the total cultivated land 
area and a dramatic improvement in equal access to land – the Gini 
coefficient with respect to land went from 0.729 to 0.384 between 1945 and 
1965.6 The rate of growth of agricultu r a l  o u t p u t  w a s  i m p r e s s i v e  b y  
international standards. The average annual rate of food production 
increased by 4%. Average farm income per household also increased by 
51.4% between 1963 and 1975, and the Gini coefficient in income in rural 
areas was at the very low level of 0.298. Poverty reduced at a rate of 20% 
per decade between 1945 and 1950, and at 10% per decade from 1965 to 
1978 (El-Ghonemy, 1990). 
 
It is important to also note that land reform programmes in Latin America 
and Africa have produced mixed results in terms of their impacts on 
poverty and food security. This can be attributed to the fact that most of 
the land reform programmes in Latin America and Africa have been 
partial reforms, in the sense that land redistribution was the main focus 
and not much support was given to beneficiaries of these programmes. 
This is in contrast to most land reform programmes in East Asia, where 
additional support was an important part of each programme. In addition, 
most land reform programmes in Latin America and Africa adopted 
collective production methods for beneficiaries rather than focusing on 
individual farmers. These differences are important in understanding the 
effect of land reform in different parts of the world, as they interact with 
other internal and external production and market conditions. In the same 
breath it should be noted that there are large costs when land reform fails, 
and this should be taken into consideration when planning and executing 
such programmes. Support for delivered livelihood assets could be more 
important in capacitating smallholder farmers than the mere delivery of 
the asset (Chimhowu, 2004). Evidence from Zimbabwe shows that 
provision of land on its own cannot enable smallholders to formulate 
agricultural production livelihood strategies to achieve a food secure 
status. As mentioned in above and particularly pertinent to research 
evidence from Zimbabwe, monetisation of the agricultural economy is 
crucial to the vulnerability status of rural populations. Availability of cash 
in circulation in rural areas gives individuals broader alternatives to 
construct diverse livelihoods that help to reduce vulnerability. Of course, 
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in most countries in Africa budgetary constraints and macro-economic 
stabilisation tended to curtail the ability of the state to support these 
farmers.  
 
3.3  Policy and institutional support  
 
As the previous section suggests, food insecurity is closely linked to 
poverty and poor agricultural performance in rural areas. Therefore 
intervention that increases own production can go a long way towards 
addressing food insecurity, not only by enabling people to grow the food 
itself, but also by providing the means through which such food can be 
acquired. However, the results of policy interventions have been mixed.  
 
In Zimbabwe between 1980 and 1986, staple maize output more than 
doubled compared to the previous decade, on the back of favourable 
commodity prices coupled with improved infrastructure and institutional 
services. Land area planted with maize rose substantially, and the amount 
of marketed maize produced by small-scale farmers represented 47% of 
total national maize output in 1986 and had risen to 90% by 1989 
(Stanning, 1989). Marketed output of finger millet rose from 386 tonnes in 
1983/1984 to 12  500 tonnes in 1985/1986. The production by small 
producers of cash crops (which provides the means by which livelihoods 
can be enhanced) also increased after agriculture policy was refocused 
towards these farmers. Cotton production (important for its cash-
generating possibilities) rose from 160 000 tonnes in 1980 to 350 000 tonnes 
in 1990. After a decade of pro-smallholder policy support, by 1991 
smallholder farmers contributed more than 50% of national maize 
production, more than 60% of cotton, 99% of sunflowers and most of the 
small grains and groundnuts that were formally marketed (Mudimu, 1992; 
Eicher, 1995; Rohrbach, 1988).7 Such was the success of the interventions in 
the 1980s that this period is referre d  t o  a s  Z i m b a b w e ’ s  s m a l l h o l d e r  
revolution (Rukuni & Eicher, 1994) and is attributed mainly to the linkage 
between technology, service organisations and institutions (or parts 
thereof) developed specifically to deliver on the policies adopted to 
advance smallholder agricultural development. Similar success at a 
smaller scale was recorded by coffee and maize farmers in Malawi (Chirwa 
et al., 2007). 
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Research in Zambia and some from Uganda and Kenya show that 
government policy was mainly directed at providing smallholder 
producers with relatively easy market access, without necessarily giving 
direct support that explicitly targeted smallholder production (supply-
side) (Bezuneh et al., 1998). As in the Zimbabwean case, subsidies for 
inputs were generally used to enable these producers to afford fertilisers 
and seeds during the pre-structural reform period. However, this, did not 
substantially improve food security in these countries for several reasons, 
including the existence of large, deeply embedded socio-economic 
inequalities, poor access to quality land by the majority of households, lack 
of appropriate technology for an ever-changing production environment, 
lack of adequate institutional and infrastructural support, and poor 
support services. As a result, the labour participation rates in rural 
agricultural production were very low. The percentage of household 
labour that spent more than 50% of their labour time on agricultural 
production kept falling, and household and individual food insecurity 
worsened (Obwona, 2002). 
 
In analysing the successes and failures of supply-side, state-led policies 
and demand-side market liberalisation in sub-Saharan Africa, Dorward et 
al. (2004) found that some of the major issues that held back progress in 
these countries included problems related to public goods, complementary 
co-ordination of policy, and market development. They describe a 
common pattern of government policy in successful green revolutions in 
terms of two active policy phases. The first phase establishes the basics, 
with investments in public goods to develop technologies that will raise 
small farms’ potential productivity. During this time, it might well be that 
extensive production and other non-efficient types of production could be 
pursued. Therefore, agricultural output or per capita agricultural gross 
domestic product (AgGDP) is directly related to food security in these 
countries. The second phase kick-starts markets, with carefully co-
ordinated complementary investments to improve small farmers’ access to 
the financial services and input and output markets necessary for 
technology adoption. This reiterates the important role of not only 
sequencing and effectiveness, but also complementary investment and 
market development in enhancing rural agricultural development. 
Unfortunately, in most sub-Saharan African countries this complementary 
sequencing has been poor; therefore most intervention has not actually 




To sustain food security, availability, access to and utilisation of food have 
to be secured (Mellor, 1984). Clearly, then, the challenges of making a 
positive impact on food availability (i.e. supply-side) are firmly rooted in 
the ability of rural-dwellers to access production inputs and land. 
Following a decade of declining productivity, in 2005 the Malawi 
government instituted a national scheme to subsidise improved seed and 
fertiliser. The results indicate the strong feasibility of investing in food 
crops grown by smallholder farmers as an initial step towards sustained 
economic growth in rural areas. As Table 4 shows, output increased. For 
the first time, Malawi exported 300 000 metric tonnes of maize grain to 
Zimbabwe in 2007.  
 
Table 4:   Malawi maize output 2003-2008 
Output 2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Production (million metric 
tonnes) 
1.98  1.61  1.23  2.58  3.44 2.78 
5 year average (2001 – 2005) 
(million metric tonnes) 
1.62  1.62 1.62 1.62 1.62 1.62 
% above average  22  -1  -24  59  112  73 
Source: FAO (2008) 
 
The number of Malawians at risk of hunger decreased to about 500 000 in 
late 2007 from 5 million in 2005.  
 
The experiences of Zimbabwe (in the 1980s) and Malawi show that with 
increased direct state intervention in providing assistance to smallholders, 
rural areas teeming with unemployed and underemployed people could 
substantially increase the volume and quality of production and 
restructure rural economies. However, providing this support has a cost 
and most Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries 
are failing to reach the 10% budgetary annual expenditure allocation for 
agriculture agreed in the 2003 Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and 
Food Security in Africa of the African Union (see Table 5), citing budgetary 
constraints.8 Be that as it may, evidence from Malawi in particular shows a 
strong positive correlation over the medium-term between expenditure 
and smallholder output and the decline of the proportion of 
undernourished people.  
 
                                                 
8 The actual decision stated, among other things, that the countries were committed ‘to the allocation of at 
least 10% of national budgetary resources to agriculture and rural development policy implementation 




Both infrastructure and extension provide a much more complex 
challenge, but enhance human capital and complements smallholder 
knowledge in the field. In addressing food security in Kenya it was 
recognised that there are many extension service providers within 
government, NGOs, private sector, religious organisations and community 
based organisations. There are also considerable resources (human, 
physical and financial), held by these organisations. The consistency and 
regularity by which farmers are assured of these resources affect their 
effectiveness (Kinyua, 2004). Hazell et al. (2006) has established that 
extension visits can change farmers output by more than 25% depending 
on the level of education of the farmer. In Zambia and Malawi it has been 
shown that a single extension visit can increase food production when 
coupled with optimal productive assets. This increases labour use by more 
than a third from a base of under 9 hours per week (Diao et al., 2007). The 
Zimbabwean success story of the 1980s mentioned earlier in was heavily 
influenced by close coordination of all services affecting the production 
activity including appropriate research and development but crucially, an 
expanded extension service (Eicher, 1995). If the land reform were to 
proceed as envisaged in countries like South Africa and Namibia, 
extension would need to be scaled up quite drastically but that would be 
result in increases of agriculture output, boosting food security.  
 
As a proxy for support, central government budget allocation to 
agriculture as a proportion to the total national budget is used in the 
empirical section. Budget support for agriculture does not include direct 
support to the sector but is just the proportions of annual allocation to the 
sector in annual national budgets. It also excludes resources allocated from 
provincial budgets and those allocated in any supplementary budgets in 
the course of the different years.  
 
For South Africa, audited expenditure on budget votes shows that the 
proportion of the national expenditure allocated to agriculture is about 1%, 
suggesting that there is room for the country to increase its support to 
smallholder agriculture towards fulfilling its commitment and in so doing 
boost the livelihoods base of smallholders by effectively lowering the costs 
of production which would increase output and lower agricultural prices, 
at least for staples like maize.  




Table 59:   Budget allocations to the agricultural sector as a percentage 
of total national budget allocation in the SADC region 





2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 
Angola 10  2.24  6.47  5.29 3.55 
Botswana 10  2.8  2.7  3.2 3.3 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
10 ns  ns  ns ns 
Lesotho   10  4.8  5.0  4.0 3.5 
Madagascar   10  ns  ns  ns 4.2 
Malawi   10  6.6  12.71  11 13.2 
Mauritius   10  3.96  2.91  2.56 ns 
Mozambique   10  6.2  4.4  3.4 3.9 
Namibia   10  7.3  6.9  8.2 8.0 
South Africa*   10  0.86  0.93  1.15 1.26 
Swaziland   10  4.97  6  4.7 3.71 
Tanzania   10  5.7  4.71  5.78 5.78 
Zambia   10  7.0  4.0  5.0 ns 
Zimbabwe** 10  11.9  5.7  4.8 3.5 
SADC average   10  5.77  5.34  5.31 5.46 
ns = not submitted to SADC 
*This is a total of allocation to the agriculture and the land affairs vote 
**Author’s calculations from various Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe publications for 2004 to 2007 
Source: SADC (2008)  
 
Of course, budget support cannot on its own achieve the desired result, 
but in most countries in the region where immediate support is needed 
central government provision of enabling infrastructure, knowledge and in 
some cases, inputs can be a strong condition for increased output in small-
scale agriculture (Rukuni et al., 2006). If this indeed is the case central 
government budgetary allocation to the sector should affect the proportion 
of people undernourished.  
 
4.    Empirical findings: estimating the effects of contributors to food 
security 
 
The proportion of undernourished people in total population [propunder 
variable] in a given year is hypothesised to depend on the amount of 
cereals produced nationally in tonnes [cereals], per capita gross domestic 
product [GDP], per capita agricultural gross domestic product [agGDP] (all 
                                                 
9 This table is given here for illustrative purposes only. The complete set of figures used in the regression 




at constant 2000 US$ prices), capital stock in agriculture (constant 1995 US$ 
prices) [capstoc], poverty levels [pov] defined as percentage of the 
population leaving below US$1 per day and proportion of national budget 
support [bugs] to agriculture in the preceding year. The idea is that the 
proportion of people who will be undernourished next year for example 
will depend on how much agriculture support and investment is provided 
in a given year. That is: 
 
PUt+1 = f(cereals, GDP, agGDP, bugs, agval, pov, capstoc)      (1) 
 
Value added is used as a proxy for agricultural processing, which is 
considered to provide alternative employment in rural areas. A simple 
semi-log linear regression10 estimated in STATA takes the following form: 
 
Ln PUt+1 = c +  1 α ln(cereals) + 2 α ln(GDP) + 3 α ln(agGDP) + 4 α  lnbugs + 
5 α ln(agval) + 6 α ln(pov) +  7 α  (capstoc)       (2) 
 
where c is a constant and  1 α to  8 α  are parameters.  
 
4.1 Summary  statistics 
 
Data used in this study is extracted from various World Bank National 
accounts, FAO and UN data sources for 200311 to create a cross sectional 
set of 38 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. There are several shortcomings 
to this approach. Most prominent are two. Firstly, there are huge 
variations between countries that make such an approach questionable. 
Panel data approaches would be better placed to deal with these between 
country variations. However, given the difficulty of putting together such 
a panel data set a cross-sectional set was compiled as the next best 
solution. Secondly, the significance of agriculture in the economies of these 
countries differs; therefore, some of the explanatory variables we use 
might actually render the regression results unrealistic for policy in some 
countries.  
 
                                                 
10 Several forms of this model were considered, but the semi-log function was chosen over other more 
elaborate forms due to its simplicity although the model significance for the various options was not hugely 
different.  




Table 6:   Summary statistics for 38 sub-Saharan countries in 2003  
Variable Mean  Standard  deviation 
Cereals '000 tonnes  2887.35  673.302 
GDP 1203.45  28757.36 
Agricultural GDP  298.71  78.9836 
Proportion of undernourished   33.76  5.67 
Capital stock in agriculture  1.87  1.43 
Agricultural value added  679.75  200.19 
Poverty 47.77  3.44 
Budget support   4.89  4,65 
Source: Data set from World Bank, FAO and UN data sources for 2003 
 
H o w e v e r ,  t h i s  d o e s  n o t  d i s t r a c t  f r o m  t h e i r  u s e  i n  a n  a n a l y s i s  l i k e  t h i s ,  
whose aim is to learn from evidence from the region and using it to draw 
implications for South Africa. It is expected that all of the parameters  1 α to 
7 α  will be negatively related to the proportion of the undernourished, with 
the exception of  6 α since it is expected that the higher the poverty levels 
the higher the proportion of people who will be in the undernourished 
group.  
 
4.2  Discussion of the results 
 
The model goodness of fit, R2 is reasonable for this type data set at 0.4027, 
which provides a high level of confidence in the validity of the model. 
Results are largely as expected confirming the validity of drawing 
variables from the framework employed. As expected the level of cereals 
produced has an inverse relationship with the proportion of 
undernourished in the population, indicating that production in these 
countries is a significant factor in addressing food insecurity. Poverty is a 
significant predictor of the proportion of people undernourished. The 
third significant variable is agricultural value added. Agricultural value 
added per worker, taken as a proxy for off-farm employment, is positive, 
confirming the idea that policy approaches to reducing food insecurity 
should consider supporting complementary processing activity within 
agriculturally important areas. The level of budgetary support too is a 
significant predictor of success. Scaling-up support to the agricultural 
sector can therefore be said to have a significant positive impact on food 
security at an individual level.  




Of note, however, is the fact that in these countries taken together at 2003 
levels, per capita GDP does not seem to explain food insecurity. In fact, it 
has an opposite sign from the one expected. This in itself is a strong 
reminder that growth does not necessarily lead to food insecurity (or vice 
versa) as other distributional issues tend to come into play. However, one 
would have expected per capita agricultural GDP to be significant, but this 
variable too is insignificant although it has the expected sign. 
  
Table 7:   Regression results 
Variable Coefficient  t-stat 
lncereals   -0.0945  -2.73 
lngdp 0.1055  0.79 
lnagrgdp -0.1509  -0.87 
lnagricval   -0.3923  -2.96 
lnpov   0.0444  4.31 
lnbugs -0.0187    -2.79 
capstoc -0.0267  -1.67 
_cons   2.2494  5.21 
R2 = 0.4027 
 
A plausible explanation for the insignificance of per capita agricultural 
GDP might be that it could be correlated to some other variables, meaning 
that they might be a problem of multicollinearity (Studenmund, 1997; 
Thomas, 1997). However, this is dispelled by the correlation matrix (Table 
9). The only variable that seems to have some significant correlation with 
this variable is per capita agricultural value added, but even that 
correlation coefficient is not extra-ordinarily high. Dropping any one of the 
variables did not seem to change the model results in a hugely significant 
way either. Nevertheless, a more robust test (the variance inflation factor, 
VIF) was conducted. The variance inflation factor (VIF) of under 2,392 
indicates that multicollinearity is not a significant problem. 
 
Two main problems (among others) are, however noted from these results. 
Firstly, data used is not smallholder data but is national data; therefore it is 
difficult to clearly isolate smallholder effects .  M o r e  e f f o r t  a n d  
disaggregated data is needed for this to be possible. Secondly, levels of 
education (human capital) strongly alluded to in the framework are not 
captured in the analysis. This is a major drawback in this article but one 
that is occasioned by serious data gaps that could not be resolved.  




5.  Conclusion 
 
When thinking of ways to boost agricultural production to enhance food 
security, this article indicates a number of livelihood assets to consider. 
Evidence in studies of smallholder production from the region suggests 
that consistent policies on institutional support, production of food and 
extension can boost the ability of poor households to produce food and 
providing themselves a livelihood. Efforts to boost agricultural production 
must focus largely on increasing production and livelihood options. 
Evidence from the region though patchy and contextual, indicate that 
where livelihood capital was complete, smallholders increase their output 
and drive the rural economy with some countries (e.g. Zimbabwe, Malawi 
and Kenya) experiencing increases (in some circumstances) and decreases 
(in periods of macroeconomic difficulties and drought years). Realising the 
potential of food and agricultural production for reducing poverty and 
hunger depends largely on the extent to which smallholder farmers are 
able to participate in productive and remunerative farming and off-farm 
activities and supported by state.  
  
The high levels of hunger in the region, particularly in the rural farm 
household sector, and the difficulties in reducing it, even when food 
supplies are high and the economy is growing, highlight a fundamental 
problem of access to food. This cannot simply be addressed solely by state 
intervention aimed at reducing food prices, since households can only 
access food if they have some cash income. Additionally, since most poor 
rural households rely on agricultural production for a significant share of 
their income, increasing agricultural productivity has a positive impact on 
increasing food insecurity and reducing rural poverty. For South Africa, 
this points towards the need to strengthen both agricultural productive 
capacity of smallholder farmers and their income-generating options. This 
could include improving their livelihood asset base in order to reduce 
poverty and improve food security. 
 
Budget support to the agricultural sector was found to lead to a reduction 
in the number of undernourished people. This suggests that central 
governments have an important role to play in creating conditions in the 
sector that could lead to a reduction in food insecurity through support to 
institutions, extension infrastructure, and other contributions to the 




inputs, access to machinery, access to knowledge, access to infrastructure 
such as fences and boreholes, small business support, support to 
agricultural processing, access to credit etc). The gaps in knowledge and 
resources for the creation of a positive enabling environment for poorly 
resourced rural populations are crucial for addressing food security in the 
region. This suggests the existence of unexploited or unutilised potential 
within rural areas that could be unlocked by addressing important aspects 
of their livelihood asset position in order to overcome key constraints on 
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Table 8:   Data, definition and source  
Variable  Definition and measurement  Source 
cereals   Cereal output in thousand tones in 2003  FAO estimates, 2007 
GDP  Per capital GDP is GDP divided by midyear population. 
Data are in constant year 2000 US$ prices 
World Bank, National 
accounts 
agGDP  Per capita agricultural GDP of the agricultural 
population 
World Bank, National 
accounts 
propund   Proportion of people undernourished (percentage)  FAO, 2007 
capstoc  Estimate of capital stock in agriculture derived by the 
FAO using data on livestock, tractors, irrigated land, 
and land under permanent crops and the average prices 
for the year 1995.  
FAO Statistics Division 
and OECD 
agval  Agricultural value added per worker in constant 2000 
constant prices is the international standard industrial 
classification (ISIC) divisions 1-5. it is the net output of a 
sector after adding all outputs and subtracting all 
intermediate inputs. 
World Bank, National 
accounts as compiled in 
FAO, 2007 
pov  Poverty is the proportion (in percentage) of population 
under the poverty below the US$1 PPP per day. This 




bugs   This is the proportion of the national annual state 






Table 9:   Correlation matrix for the variables in the empirical model, 
equation (2) 
   Cereal
s  
GDP agGDP  propun
d  
capstoc  bugs agricval  pov 
Cereals  1.0000  -0.1073 -0.0365 -0.2489  0.1428  0.1238  0.2357  -0.0162 
GDP  -0.1073  1.0000 0.4467 -0.1867  0.2335 0.1055  0.4729  -0.0898 
agGDP  -0.0365  0.4467 1.0000 -0.4351  0.2806 0.1031  0.4616  0.0487 
propund   -0.2489 -0.1867 -0.4351 1.0000  -0.3910 -0.1679  -0.3556  0.2404 
capstoc  0.1428 0.2335 0.2806 -0.3910  1.0000 0.4345  0.2691  -0.1118 
bugs  0.1238 0.1055 0.1031 -0.1679  0.4345 1.0000  0.1054  0.1219 
agricval   0.2357 0.4729 0.4613 -0.3556  0.2691 0.1054  1.0000  -0.2147 
pov  -0.0162 -0.0898 0.0487  0.2404  -0.1118 0.1219  -0.2147  1.0000 
Source: Generated by EViews 
 
 
 